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ABSTRACT

Title of research paper: Integration of Techniques related to Ship Monitoring:
Research on the Establishment of Chinese Maritime
Domain Awareness System

Degree:

MSc

There are thousands of ships engaged on international voyage all around the world
and numerous vessels are navigating in the waters under the jurisdiction of China.
However, as one of the largest Flag States, busiest Port States and important Coastal
States, China has limited effective mechanisms and supports for implementing
maritime surveillance on all of its sea area. This paper concentrates on the issue of
improving this situation with the help of modern technologies. It introduces the
background of research topic, gives a definition of Maritime Domain Awareness
(MDA), features of current techniques related to ship monitoring, status quo of IT
developments home and abroad, reviews relevant researches and experiments that
have been conducted and proposes general solutions to establish Chinese MDA
system. In conclusion, the author proved the necessity and feasibility of establishing
a Chinese MDA platform, and strived to provide prerequisites to establish such
system in order to promote the capability of maritime governance and services of
China MSA by taking the advantage of modern technologies.

KEY WORDS:
maritime domain awareness, AIS, LRIT, SAR, maritime
surveillance, vessel monitoring system
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Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 Background
Shipping has served world economy for almost 5000 years and it provides a
sophisticated transport service to almost everywhere on the global (Stopford, 2009),
and more than 90% of world freight is carried by ships (IMO, 2012a; Lorange and
Fjeldstad, 2010). According to the search result obtained from Global Integrated
Shipping Information System (GISIS) on the IMO website, 108,606 unique vessels
are under the status of “in service/command” as of May 15 2015. A research proved
that “there are approximately 50,000 merchant ships in operation, registered to more
than 150 nations” (Lorange and Fjeldstad, 2010, p.185). In other words, there are
basically tens of thousands of ships engaged on international voyage all around the
world today. With the economic development of China in recent decades, more and
more ships join the fleets sailing on the waters under the jurisdiction of China. Results
of searching IT system’s database of China MSA indicates that voyages of
international ships entered in or departed from Chinese ports in 2014 are 288,170 and
287,538
respectively.

The

number will reach
11,484,957

and

11,481,883
respectively if ships
operating

in

domestic are also
included. Trends of
ships’ voyages are
1

illustrated in figure 1 and more detailed information could be found in table 1. Since
such huge numbers of vessels are sailing on China’s waters, the competent authorities
of Chinese government definitely need to implement effective measures to monitor
the activities of the vessels so as to improve maritime safety, security and
environmental protection.

Table 1: Statistics of vessels entered in or departured from Chinese ports
year

2011

item

voyage (thousand)
302
entry
cargo( million ton) 1843.2
GT (million)
4258.2
international
voyage (thousand) 292.8
departure cargo( million ton)
538.3
GT (million)
4457
voyage (thousand) 11630.8
entry
cargo( million ton) 3213.2
GT (million)
6963.5
domestic
voyage (thousand) 11483
departure cargo( million ton) 4446.6
GT (million)
7267.8
entry
voyage
11932.8
total
(thousand)
departure
11775.8

2012

2013

2014

292.6
2002.4
4459.1
303.9
535.4
4323.7
10912.3
3136.8
7323.6
11245.3
370283.3
7278.8
11204.9
11549.2

292.8
2281.2
4757.7
294.9
573.4
4808.3
11377.5
3617
7783.5
11916.9
3556.1
8002.5
11670.3
12211.8

288.17
2292.3
4986.1
287.5
681.7
4921.2
11196.8
3835.4
7856.5
11194.3
3809.5
7888.4
11484.97
11481.8

Source: Compiled by author based on data searched from IT system of China MSA

It has been a consensus that 21st century is a century of ocean, thus, many countries
have increased their strategic investments in marine industries (Jiang et al, 2014).
Shipping industry and marine economy are playing a more and more important role in
China too. A report to the 18th National Congress, one of most significant policy
program for China’s development, pointed out that China should enhance marine
economy, protect the marine ecological environment with a view to safeguarding
China's maritime rights and interests, and building China into a maritime power (Hu,
2012). Therefore, in the perspective of China’s national strategy, it’s necessary to be
aware of the situation of Chinese maritime domain as far as possible.

Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), as defined by IMO (2012b, p.51), is “the
2

effective understanding of any activity associated with the maritime environment that
could impact upon the security, safety, economy or environment”. The concept of
MDA is to fuse as many data sources as possible to a Geographic Information System
(GIS) format and apply pattern recognition algorithms to the data, which characterizes
the maritime traffic at the area of interest (Detsis et al, 2012). From the global
perspective, some MDA systems have already been established under the support of
new techniques such as LRIT, AIS, spaceborne SAR1 and etc. For instance, CISE and
GMES of the European Union, “Deep Water Plan” and AKDEMO of the United
States, and RADARSAT of Canada, and those cases would be introduced in chapter 3.
However, in spite of the demand of maritime surveillance in China and the operation
of mature systems abroad, there has been no comprehensive DMA system integrating
multi data resource in China so far.
1.2 Objectives of the research
The above mentioned background implies the necessity of the creation of measures
for monitoring the status of vessels as well as the whole maritime domain. The author,
as a staff of IT data center of China MSA and operator of China LRIT National Data
Center (NDC), has a strong desire to explore a way to establish maritime surveillance
platform via integrating multi data resources. Thus, this paper would analyze, in terms
of techniques applied to merchant shipping particularly, the possibility and ways of
establishing Chinese MDA system, in order to make the research:

.1 draw attention to the issues discussed in the paper;
.2 sum up potential techniques related to ship monitoring;
.3 offer a fundamental solution for integrating specific data resources;
.4 facilitate the practical development of Chinese MDA system; and
.5 provide information supports for decision-maker(s).

3

1.3 Necessity and feasibility from legal point of view
The author believes that maritime governance should always comply with
international treaties to which the State is a Contracting Government or a party. Thus
it’s necessary to analyze the rights and obligations under related international
conventions as well as accordingly domestic legislation.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is acknowledged
to be a “framework convention” or “umbrella convention” on the issues related to
ocean (Hesse, 2015). Some critical provisions of UNCLOS in relation to monitoring
of ships are summarized as follows (UNCLOS, 1982; Sohn, 2010):

.1 Article 17, Article 18, Article 19 and Article 21 prescribe the “right of innocent
passage” and corresponding definitions, requirements, prejudicial behaviors and
rights of legislation formulated by Coastal States;
.2 Article 22 prescribes sea lanes and traffic separation schemes in the territorial
sea of a Coastal State, which empowers Coastal State to require navigation routes
of foreign vessels;
.3 Article 24 and Article 25 prescribe obligation and right of Coastal State
respectively, providing States with right to take necessary steps to prevent
non-innocent passage;
.4 Article 56 prescribes the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of Coastal State in
the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ);
.5 Article 95 and Article 96 prescribe immunities of warships and ships used only
on government non-commercial service on the high sea; and
.6 Article 110 and Article 111 prescribe right of visit and right of hot pursuit
respectively.

In summary, on the one hand, the UNCLOS stipulates obligations for Coastal States to
take measures to guarantee the rights of vessels sailing on the waters under their
4

jurisdiction; on the other hand, the UNCLOS also gives rights to Coastal States to
safeguard the their own rights. Thus in order to fulfill the obligations and to perform
those rights, Coastal States need to establish appropriate mechanisms to know what
happens on their waters and to take effective actions whenever. With regard to this
objective, the author is of the opinion that means of maritime surveillance is necessary
for Coastal States and that establishing MDA system would be a good choice for
implementing relevant provisions of the UNCLOS.

Besides UNCLOS, some provisions which support the aforesaid opinion are
prescribed in other international treaties, for example, SOLAS, MARPOL and the
International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR2 Convention). In
addition, supporting regulations are not only given by international treaties but also
could be found in China’s domestic laws such as Maritime Traffic Safety Law, Marine
Environment Protection Law and the Law of the People's Republic of China on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, etc. Since this paper does not primarily
focus on legal regimes, detailed information on legislation is summarized in the
Appendix A rather than to be discussed in this chapter. Whilst, the general conclusion
by analyzing legal regimes is that establishing effective mechanism for maritime
surveillance is allowed and even encouraged by both international conventions and
domestic regulations.

Of course, it should be noted that analysis of necessity and feasibility for establishing
a comprehensive system shall be based on an all-around assessment covering enough
relevant aspects. However, the author considers that it’s premature to discuss other
factors until necessary information has been introduced. Thus more detailed analysis
of necessity and feasibility would be undertaken in “section 4.1”.
1.4 Methodology and primary contents of the research
This paper essentially concentrates on the following contents based on investigation
5

method, theoretical analysis method, case study method, and experimental method as
well:

.1 introduction and corresponding analyses of maritime surveillance;
.2 globally successful cases of MDA systems;
.3 feasibility study on technical issues; and
.4 proposed solution for establishing Chinese MDA system.
1.5 Chapter summary
To sum up, maritime surveillance becomes increasingly significant because issues of
safety and marine environmental protection in shipping industry are widely concerned
about. China, as one of the major shipping countries and a State with large area of
marine territory, is closely relevant to this issue. Establishing appropriate MDA
system is permitted and recommended by international and national legislation, and is
supported by modern techniques. This paper conducts research on the topic of
establishing Chinese MDA system by integrating techniques related to ship
monitoring.

6

Chapter 2 Available technologies for ship monitoring

As mentioned in Chapter 1, issues of shipping safety, marine environment and marine
economy are arousing more and more attention. Meanwhile some technical methods
have been approached as tools of maritime surveillance for fishery monitoring,
merchant vessel traffic monitoring and marine environmental protection detection. It’s
essential to identify and review the features of existing ship monitoring and tracking
systems in advance with a view to integrating them. Hence, this chapter would briefly
introduce techniques related to monitoring of merchant vessels.
2.1 LRIT
The establishment of Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) of ships system
was subjected to the IMO’s resolution MSC.202 (81) adopted on May 19, 2006. This
resolution amends chapter V of SOLAS and consequently binds all the Contracting
Governments of the convention. LRIT is basically a message transmitting system
between shipborne terminals and data centers onshore with the help of satellites,
which realizes the goals of global identification and tracking of vessels so as to
enhance maritime security, as initially primary aim, as well as to improve maritime
safety, marine environment protection and also search and rescue. The LRIT system is
composed of shipborne satellite communication equipment, Communications Service
Providers, Application Service Providers, LRIT Data Centers (DCs), the International
LRIT Data Exchange (IDE) and the LRIT Data Distribution Plan (DDP), whose
architecture is illustrated in figure 2 (IMO, 2006; IMO, 2008). The IDE is operated by
the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) in Lisbon, Portugal, while the DDP
server is operated in IMO headquarter in London, and 56 DCs are operating as of 2
January 2015 (IMO, 2015a).
7

LRIT regulation principally applies to ships are of 300 gross tons or above on
international voyages. Data transmitted by LRIT covers ship’s identity, position and
time of transmission, and those data should be sent to corresponding DC of Flag State
at least 4 times per day. However, the report frequency could be increased up to 15
minutes for a specified period, or to report immediately as a result of polling request.
The LRIT messages of ships could be sent from Flag State to a request state which is
entitled to receive, in other words, a state could monitor a ship which calls at its port
or sailing within 1000 nautical miles (NM) from its coastline. By doing so, ship’s
location status could be shared between states. Although the transmitted data are only
three types of information, nevertheless it should be highlighted that LRIT achieve
essentially global monitoring of ships and establish onshore framework of
data-sharing between Member States of IMO.

Besides the aforementioned characteristics, some other features of LRIT could be
summarized as (IMO, 2015b; IMO, 2008):
.1 it’s a satellite-based and near-real-time data transmitting mechanism, which
uses existing communication systems (INMARSAT and Iridium for example) to
8

realize additional function;
.2 it’s theoretically a global coverage system which extremely extends ship
monitoring area; and
.3 it generates a SAR2 SURPIC request to all DCs for vessels in a defined area,
which could facilitate tasks of Search and Rescue.
2.2 AIS
2.2.1 General introduction
Automatic Identification System (AIS), or Universal AIS, is defined by the
International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities
(IALA) (2004, p.14) as: “an autonomous and continuous broadcast system… It is
capable of exchanging information… handle multiple reports at rapid update
rates…ensuring reliable and robust operation”. AIS was mainly designed for
navigation safety especially for collision avoidance (be vividly shown as figure 3) at
first, and is widely used because of its capability of broadcasting data about a ship to
other vessels and onshore
receivers

nearby.

The

broadcast of AIS complies
with

SOTDMA

Organized
Multiple
through

Time

Division

Access)

protocol

VHF

Frequency)

(Self

(Very

range,

on

High
the

condition that two transmitters
within range of each other
would never send message at
same time.

The carriage of AIS was required by the chapter V of SOLAS Convention, and the
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carriage requirement basically applies to sea-going vessels of 300 GT and above,
vessels greater than 500 GT and all passenger ships (Jun et al, 2010). Those AIS made
mandatory by the convention is Class-A type. And for the ships not covered by the
requirement of SOLAS, a type of Class-B AIS is widely used.

The IMO performance standard for AIS requires that AIS shall: (a) provide
information; (b) receive such information automatically from similarly fitted ships; (c)
monitor and track ships; (d) exchange data with shore-based facilities (IALA, 2004).
There are four essential types of messages sent by AIS: (a) static information e.g.
IMO number; (b) dynamic information such as position and speed of the ship; (c)
voyage related information, for instance, ship’s draught and destination; (d) Short
safety-related messages subjected to input. The messages are broadcasted depending
upon the message type and ship’s status. For example, static information are basically
sent every 6 minutes; while the update rate of dynamic information inversely
increases with the ship’s speed, from 3 minutes to 2 seconds (IMO, 1998). Standards,
recommendations and guidelines regarding to AIS have been adopted by relevant
organizations, so more detailed information could be found in documents such as
MSC 74(69), Resolution A.917 (22) as amended by Resolution A.956 (23), ITU-R
M.1371-1, IEC Standard 61993 Part 2 and IALA Guidelines on the Automatic
Identification System (AIS) Volume 1 etc. Since this research would primarily focus on
data resource rather than equipment technology itself, thus technical details on
equipment would be not introduced in the paper.
AIS technique is probably one of the most significant developments in maritime
navigation since the introduction of radar. AIS data could be collected to help
administrative authorities enhance maritime awareness and surveillance. Two popular
modes of AIS-data collection will be introduced below.
2.2.2 Shore-based AIS
By means of the SOTDMA and other assistant protocols and through VHF
10

frequencies for AIS (161.975 and 162.025 MHz) (IALA, 2004), the AIS messages
could not only be transmitted between ships but also be obtained by coastal receivers.
In this way, the traffic picture of ships sailing near coastline could be drawn with the
help of computer software. However, messages that could be received are limited by
distance from transmitter. The range of coastal AIS receiver is typically 40 NM, 100
NM may be reached under ideal circumstance (European Commission, 2008), thus,
unlike LRIT, the contribution for ship monitoring made by conventional AIS
mechanism is limited within coastal area. In practice, the shore-based AIS data is
always collected to illustrate situational picture of vessel traffic near coastline.
However, this is not enough for awareness of shipping because of its naturally global
property.
2.2.3 Satellite-based AIS
Satellite-based AIS, as its name suggests, collects vessel data globally using satellite
network. Accurately, the reception of AIS signal on satellite base was considered as
means of realization of LRIT, but reservations about satellite-based AIS were
expressed by IMO because of reasons such as integrity and confidentiality (IMO,
2009; IMO, 2009; IMO, 2004).

Technically, AIS signal could be detected from space by a standard AIS receiver up to
1,000 km, so that satellite-based AIS reception could be realized by optimized antenna
and equipment on satellite. A constellation of such satellites could provide necessary
data for maritime surveillance (Høye et al, 2008). Research shows that one single
satellite can handle up to 900 ships at 1,000 km altitude and that a global constellation
could handle up to 1,300 ships with a ship information update rate of 1/hour, and
those detection possibilities remain more than 99%. This means that satellite-based
AIS mode is possible and basically reliable for commercial development. Having
realized the possibility and that awareness of ship’s position is needed by many
stakeholders such as maritime authorities, shipping companies, etc. Thus endeavors
11

have been made by commercial organizations with the aim to break the restriction of
receiving distance, which would meet customers’ demand more satisfactorily. In this
context, satellite-based AIS data collection technology was rapidly developed.
According to information of ORBCOMM, a leading company focused on
satellite-AIS, a global network of low-earth orbit (LEO) satellites and accompanying
ground infrastructure consisting of 16 ground stations and one network control center
has already been established as of March 2015 (the components of satellite-AIS are
shown in figure 4). Moreover, 19 AIS-enabled satellites were planned to compose the
constellation by the middle of 2015 (Best, 2015).

2.3 SAR1
Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR1) is a form of radar which is typically fitted on a
moving platform such as a
satellite or an aircraft. By
doing so, SAR1 uses the
motion of its antenna over a
target region to break the
limitation of antenna size and
long

distance,

consequently

and
improves

resolution of images. Its basic
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principle is demonstrated in figure 5 (after technical processing, effect of an antenna
with length “B” aperture could be obtained) (Su, 2014; Dong and Guo, 2005). As a
kind of remote sensing technology, SAR1 is employed for many purposes, such as
engineering, land planning and environment surveillance, so far as marine
surveillance is concerned, mainly used for the detection of ships and/or oil pollution
(Pieralice et al, 2014).

There are two reasons for using satellite-based SAR as a tool of marine surveillance:
(a) SAR sensor is an active detection method that is not restricted by conditions of
weather or light, meaning that SAR can take high resolution imageries no matter
when it’s day or night, sunny or cloudy; (b) Being fitted on satellite makes it possible
for SAR sensor to obtain contiguous data over large ocean areas in a short period of
time. Many researches of SAR application on ship detection have been conducted in
the last two decades. Researches prove that classical ship detection measure relies on
detection of high-value pixels compared to the local background statistics, or named
as Constant False Alarm Rate (CFAR). And based on CFAR method, some improved
measures have been generated such as visual attention, Difference of Gauss
scale-space and Radiometric-Spatial Analysis. However, to sum up, there are two
essential methods of ship detection from SAR imagery: (a) detection of ship herself;
and (b) detection of wake of a ship (Pieralice et al, 2014; Amoon et al, 2013; Detsis et
al, 2012). The theory of SAR1 will be further discussed in section 5.2.2.
2.4 VTS
Vessel traffic services (VTS) system is a marine traffic monitoring system typically
established by maritime authorities as required by regulation V/12 of SOLAS
convention. Development of VTS originated from the mid-twentieth century and has
been improved several times with the applications of technologies. It should be noted
that VTS itself is not a system but a series of services offered by VTS operators of
port or maritime authorities, while the physical system of a VTS is basically
13

composed of some sub-systems: (a) VHF radiotelephony communication sub-system;
(b) Radar sub-system; (c) Radar data processing sub-system; (d) information
transmission sub-system; (e) Management information sub-system; (f) AIS
sub-system, etc. (Liu et al, 2006). Such a comprehensive system provides three
different levels of services to shipping: (a) information; (b) navigational assistance;
and (c) traffic management, with aims to prevent the development of dangerous
situation and to essentially enhance maritime safety and efficiency (Nuutinen et al,
2007). The exchange of information in VTS system’s operation is demonstrated in
figure 6.

However, it should also be noted that VTS system is basically operated for traffic
surveillance in port area. The reasons for this situation might be: on the one hand, port
area is generally busiest traffic area liable to collision risk more and needs more
navigational assistance; on the other hand, it’s a result of technology limitation since
surveillance of waters beyond port area is obviously also demanded.
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2.5 Ship reporting system
Ship reporting systems may be operated on mandatory or voluntary basis. Mandatory
ship reporting is primarily subjected to adoption by the IMO in compliance with
Regulation V/8-1 of SOLAS Convention and the Guidelines and criteria for ship
reporting systems adopted by resolution MSC.43 (64). For example, “Off Chengshan
Jiao Promontory” amended by MSC94 is a mandatory ship reporting system of China
(IMO, 2014). Whilst, many ship reporting systems, aiming to facilitate SAR2
operation,

are

operating

on

voluntary

basis.

For

instance,

Automated

Mutual-assistance Vessel Rescue System (AMVER) has been operated by US Coast
Guard since 1958 (USCG,
2015a),

Australian

Ship

Reporting System (AUSREP)
was established in 1973 in a
partly mandatory basis, and
China Ship Reporting system
(CHISREP) has been operated
in Shanghai, China since 2005.
Figure

7

illustrates

the

reporting area of CHISREP.

It should be pointed out that different voluntary reporting systems may be with
distinct reposting requirements such as message format and reporting manner, which
makes them difficult to be integrated smoothly.
2.6 Others
2.6.1 Information collected from spot
In accordance with the principle of radio-relay station, data could be retransmitted
from spot to onshore data center through special equipment on patrol vessel or
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helicopter. The radio-relay station is specifically designed for dedicated purpose. For
example, figure 8 shows a radio-relay equipment of fishery authority of China
(CARERI, 2012). Maybe another example would be taken to illustrate this point more
clearly. AIS message received by a terminal on shipboard could be re-transmitted to
other receivers, meaning that the relaying function could be used to extend
transmission distance. Of course, the radio-relay transmission depends upon specific
equipment and transition station such as patrol vessel at sea.

2.6.2 Others
Besides the abovementioned techniques, VSAT（Very Small Aperture Terminal）,
CCTV (Closed Circuit Television), BeiDou satellite system are also capable of
capturing or transmitting of marine situational picture. Nevertheless, since they might
probably not be
fit

for

long-distance
capture

or

transmission

of

large amount of
data, thus they
would

not

be

elaborated on in
this paper.
2.7 Chapter summary
In summary, this chapter briefly reviews existing technical methods for maritime
surveillance. While, it’s noted that those ship-monitoring technologies were basically
generated from different backgrounds with distinct focuses of targets and areas, thus
they generally represent different features and independent data standards. In other
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words, the introduced technologies for monitoring ship’s position and/or activity have
both advantages and disadvantages of themselves. For example, LRIT is of global
coverage but with low reporting frequency; conventional AIS or shore-based AIS
transmits near real-time position message but is limited by short coverage and
manually input; while as to the space-based sensing measures such as satellite-based
AIS and satellite-based SAR1, as a result of operating by commercial companies (e.g.
Inmarsat, Orbcomm), the cost of those data sources are relatively high, and reliability
as well as confidentiality of such data are also to be concerned about. Therefore,
generally speaking, there is no one sole technology or data source is suitable for
achieving all the objectives of maritime domain awareness. Consequently, integration
of suitable data sources that could be cross-correlated with each other might be a wise
solution, which will be discussed in the following chapters.
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Chapter 3 Developing status of maritime surveillance from global perspective

3.1 European Union
The European Union (EU), as a politico-economic union of 28 member states
(Wikipedia, 2015), significantly improve the development of both the European and
the globe through its institutions e.g. the European Commission (EC). While
European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), as an agency of EU, plays a leading role
on matters related to maritime safety, security and marine pollution prevention.
Endeavors for maritime domain awareness have been made by the EU for many years,
and some achievements would be introduced below.
3.1.1 CISE
In order to enhance the effectiveness and coast efficiency of surveilling European
maritime domain, after assessing situational, legal, beneficial and other related issues,
the Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE) program was decided by the
EC through the adoption of conclusions as well as communications (EU, 2011). The
CISE is defined as “a voluntary collaborative process in the European Union seeking
to further enhance and promote relevant information sharing between authorities
involved in maritime surveillance” (EMSA, 2014a, pp.9-10). As EU’s expectation,
CISE will integrate existing surveillance systems and data could be exchange easily
so that all authorities concerned would share the information they need for their
missions at sea.

The maritime surveillance systems to be integrated include LRIT, shore-based and
space-based AIS, and products of EU’s precious projects such as SafeSeaNet (Safe
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Sea Network: A European Platform for Maritime Data Exchange between maritime
transport authorities of Member States), EUROSUR (European border surveillance
system), etc. One of the three consensus major benefits of CISE is believed to
improve safer, securer and cleaner seas, and the public actors would benefit from it,
including coast guards, traffic monitoring, environmental pollution prevention,
fisheries, border control, tax and general law enforcement authorities (EU, 2010). A
roadmap and six steps towards the roadmap were agreed upon. In 2013, an analysis
conducted by Gartner (2013) shows that CISE can be realized over a ten year period
for a cost ranging from 83 to 142 m€. The illustration of CISE is shown in figure 9.

3.1.2 GMES
Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) is an EU’s Earth
monitoring Program for improving European capacity for Earth Observation. It is a
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long-term programme, starting from 1998, built on partnerships between the Union,
the Member States, the European Space Agency (ESA) and other relevant European
stakeholders. The GMES system is characterized by four key features, and its
architecture is based on three components: a service component that delivers
information in support of environment and security policies, and two observation
components (in-situ, and space-based including satellite-based SAR1) that provide the
data needed for operating the services. It provides services to public policy makers
and individuals (Liebig and Aschbacher, 2005; EC, 2005). The infrastructures and
components of GMES are illustrated in figure 10.

3.1.3 CleanSeaNet
The CleanSeaNet program entering into operation in April 2007 is on the basis of
satellite-based SAR1 sensing, aiming to detect possible oil pollution caused by both
illegal discharge and accidental spill. The first generation of CleanSeaNet ended its
service life in January 2011. In nearly four year’s period, CleanSeaNet service was
basically operated on the basis of 3 polar orbiting SAR satellites (ENVISAT,
RADARSAT-1 and RADARSAT-2) and 5 receiving ground stations, which achieved
main outcomes as follows (EMSA, 2014b):
.1 delivering more than 8,000 satellite images;
.2 monitoring over 1,000 million km2;
.3 detecting 8,866 potential oil spills and half of them were subsequently
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confirmed; and
.4 providing emergency support for 10 accidental pollutions.

The aforesaid detection outcomes of the whole Europe are demonstrated in figure 11.
Gaining benefits from CleanSeaNet 1st generation, the 2nd one has been operating
since February 2011.

3.2 The United States
The United States Coast Guard (USCG) has safeguarded maritime interests of the
USA for many years. One of the reasons for its success might be innovation and
application of hi-tech instruments. For instance, a “C4ISR” (Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance)
Program has been executing with the intention of improving situational awareness.
Through the use of integrated communication systems, C4ISR program further
enhances the information-sharing capability of USCG (USCG, 2015b). The Alaska
AKDEMO is another example demonstration of marine surveillance whose
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infrastructure is shown as figure 12.

3.3 Canada
Just like its neighbor of the United States, Canada also concerns about the issue of
maritime surveillance. A good case in point is that, in 2011, delegations of Canada
introduced Canadian MDA system twice at meeting of MSC 89 and 10th session of Ad
Hoc LRIT Group respectively. The Canadian MDA system was integrated with data
sources from interdepartmental sensors including LRIT so as to provide situational
information of Canadian marine domain (IMO, 2011a; IMO, 2011b).
3.4 Status quo in China
Since the purpose of this paper is to research on the establishment of Chinese MDA
system, the development of marine surveillance as well as the overall status quo of IT
systems shall be reviewed too. It’s believed too early to discuss maritime surveillance
without introducing the competent authority. China MSA under the Ministry of
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Transport takes the responsibilities of maritime safety, security, prevention of
pollution from ships, and protection of seafarers’ rights. Other official agencies (e.g.
the Customs, Ministry of Environment, etc.) are also involved in superintendence of
marine affairs.

Although a comprehensive MDA platform for all related authorities is an ideal target
to be achieved, the author believes that focus the first step will be reasonable for the
ultimate goal could not be achieved in one day. Therefore, as the first step, this paper
would merely concentrate on creating MDA system within the scope of China MSA.
3.4.1 Existing platforms for MDA
Despite more and more IT systems have been established in the last two decades and
some of them are capable to detect, monitor and/or track activities of vessel, those
systems are basically independent from each other. The primary status quo of such
systems is summarized as follow:
.1 Chinese LRIT NDC has been operating since July 2009 as required by SOLAS
convention. Statistics show that 1,196 ships flying the flag of China and 2,126
ships flying the flag of Hong Kong, China are registered in the NDC’s database
as of May 2015, subjecting to a search result performed by the author. This
implies that huge data (approximately 3.15 million LRIT messages received per
year and 878.7 thousands messages sent annually) are available as a result of
storage from such large number of vessel and so long period of duration.
However, those big data are not used by any system other than LRIT itself.
.2 The first VTS center was established in 1978 in China, and there are already 37
VTS centers operating in ports of China as of November 2014 (Fujian MSA,
2014). While those VTS centers are isolated as several “information islands”
within various ports only, moreover, they are products of three different
manufactures with distinct and encrypted data formats.
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.3 The establishment of Chinese AIS systems started from 2005 and continues to
the present. Through nearly ten years’ efforts, one national AIS center, 3 district
AIS centers and 19 regional AIS centers with totally 121 base stations of
shore-based AIS have been built as of 2014, which constitutes Chinese coastal
AIS network.
Besides, internal water AIS network composed of 4 district centers and 143 base
stations is already established (Wang et al, 2013). A public service platform has
been recently provided with only shore-based AIS data, meaning that the
information is limited within 40 NM from coastline typically.
.4 Information could be collected by the CHISREP, Chinese ship reporting
system introduced in chapter 2, become much less than before since it’s basically
on a voluntary basis.
.5 Commercial IT platforms have been produced during recent years, and several
outstanding ones are capable of searching via satellite-based AIS. But most of
them do not achieve the expected results because lack of finance and data
accuracy, etc.
.6 There is no platform providing information of maritime surveillance dedicated
to merchant shipping based on satellite SAR data in China so far.
Figure 13 shows compiled screenshots illustrating the aforementioned platforms.
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3.4.2 Top-Down Design strategy for IT development of China MSA
Information Technology or IT is effectively improving efficiency of human’s work
and is significantly changing our society. A recent literature view, basing on 152
articles, demonstrates that: “the use of IT across diverse fields and the reliance on IT
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for high-end, routine operations and common use is growing” (Shaikh and Karjaluoto,
2015, p.542). The importance of IT has been recognized by China MSA too. IT
(including a set of systems, technologies, processes, applications, and software) has
been developed in full swing in the field of Chinese maritime governance during the
last 15 years. Particularly, a Top-Down Design strategy for IT development of China
MSA has been implemented since 2011.

China MSA pursues to realize “intelligence MSA”, or “digitization MSA”, with the
help of IT. Top-Down Design is a strategy for IT development of the overall
organization of China MSA including 14 Branch-Bureau and 28 Regional-Bureau.
The strategy is a technical roadmap for IT development involving various aspects,
such as objectives, infrastructure design, key systems to be developed and their basic
features, as well as the general implementation arrangements and requirements. By
doing so, the framework of IT of China MSA was basically determined for future
years, which means that essential subsystems would be further supported to develop
and that the determination is in a stage of general plan rather than detailed blueprint.

According to the design, the future MSA’s overall IT system will consist of two
primary portals facing internal users and external clients respectively, which will be
an integration of 27 existing subsystems including AIS, LRIT, etc. (see Appendix B
and Figure 26 for details). The architecture of the system is designed as
inter-invocation of hardware resources between individual Bureaus and two primary
data centers located in Shanghai and Beijing. The infrastructure, hardware, integration,
service invocation and network rely on popular technologies, such as cloud platform,
virtual machine, SOA (Service-Oriented Architecture), ESB (Enterprise Service Bus),
BPM (Business Process Management), etc. (China MSA, 2011). Figure 14
demonstrates the architecture of Top-Down Design and its relationship with MDA
data sources.
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Figure 14: illustration of the infrastructure of Top-Down Design and
its relationship with ship monitoring data source (being partly under construction)
Source: Compiled by author based on information from China MSA

Top-Down design strategy has been implemented since 2012, annually consuming
budget at a level of ten millions US dollar in the last three years. So far, the
framework of Shanghai Data Center with the mode of “cloud platform” has been
basically established; Beijing Data Center and other secondary data centers are under
optimization construction; ten databases processing essential maritime data (six static
information databases and four dynamic information databases) have been created. As
shown in figure 14, some of existing technical instruments for ship monitoring have
been considered integrating into the overall IT system of China MSA. Nonetheless, it
should be noted again, there is no exact plan of integration for various data sources
related to ship monitoring. In other words, the Top-Down design confirms that the
integration of MDA data sources into the comprehensive IT system should be done in
27

the future, but does not describe how to make it.
3.5 Chapter summary
To sum up, this chapter introduces the development status of IT systems for maritime
surveillance all around the world and some successful cases in the field in particular.
Moreover, the status quo of China, both the existing MDA platforms and the
Top-Down Design strategy, is introduced with the purpose of analyzing actions to be
taken. Findings of this chapter might be summarized as follows:

.1 There are wide gaps existing between China and worldwide leading cases. For
example, the EU has developed MDA platform integrated with multi-data sources.
Furthermore, those platforms’ performances are expected to be continuously
improved under the supports of sustainable developing arrangements, e.g. the
CISE

program.

By

contrast,

some

essential,

alternatively

called

as

convention-required, platforms are operating in China. But data of those Chinese
platforms isolated from each other, which forms several “information islands”
and reduces the usage and efficiency of those independent systems. In other
words, expected effect has not been obtained although China MSA’s investment
on IT has been at a relative high level for years.

.2 It’s a consensus that making use of IT could improve working efficiency as
well as administrative quality. And the importance of applying IT is realized by
China MSA. While, despite that the overall IT system of China MSA is being
constructed for optimization under the strategy of Top-Down Design and that the
necessity of establishing a more effective IT platform for maritime surveillance is
confirmed, no specified implementation arrangements or technical instruction has
been adopted yet.

.3 The author holds the view that it’s a good opportunity to carefully consider in
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details when to establish Chinese MDA system. On the one hand, China MSA’s
overall IT system is under reconstruction for years, so that financial support will
be probably guaranteed; on the other hand, experiences of operating domestic
platforms and learning from successful abroad cases would obviously accelerate
development of Chinese MDA system. For instance, integration of multi-data
sources, such as shore-based and satellite-based AIS, SAR1 and LRIT, has been
proved to be a feasible and reasonable measure to further improve the
effectiveness of MDA.
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Chapter 4 Analyses of establishing Chinese MDA

4.1 Necessity and feasibility analyses
In section 1.3, the necessity and feasibility of establishing of China’s MDA were
discussed solely form legal perspective. It’s far from enough for initiating such an
important project. Since relevant information has been introduced in the previous
chapters, more details are introduced in this chapter.
4.1.1 Necessity analysis
As mentioned in chapter one, with respect to necessity of establishing Chinese MDA
platform, first of all, the author would like to remind the facts: As a large Flag State,
China has approximately 1,300 vessels or 28.1 million gross tonnage engaged in
international voyage out of 220 thousands of registered vessels (China MSA, 2014);
as a Port State, China has nearly 3 billion tons cargo-handling capacity per year (as
shown in table 1); and as a Coastal State, China has 18,000 km coastline and 3.5
million square kilometers territorial sea. This means that China is definitely an
important shipping country and meanwhile China is influenced by shipping in many
domains, such as economy, trading, marine environment, ecosystem, society, etc.
Thus, shipping activities need to be monitored, supervised, and of course also be
served and facilitated as far as practicable.

Secondly, the author would like to share information gained from a specific research
conducted in 2013 on the strategy for implementing China’s sea power. Some related
information is extracted and fundamental resources of China MSA are summarized in
table 2 (Shenzhen MSA, 2013).
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Table 2: Fundamental resources of China MSA (as of November, 2013)2
Number of patrol vessel
(classified by length of vessel, L: m)

General information

Organization
structure

H.R.
Sea area

14 Branch Bureaus with
133 sub-branch Bureaus
for enforcement of
international treaties. and
28 Regional Bureaus
governing inner waters
only
approximately: 23,000.
(exclude Regional Bureau)
3.5 million square
kilometers

>100
&
oceangoing

>100,
nonocean
going

5

32

60<L 40<L 20<L
<100 <60
<40

<20

helicopter

total
2

55

73

308

455

928

Source: Compiled by author based on information from a study report of Shenzhen MSA
The statistic in table 2 presents the awkward situation facing China MSA. Please
further think about: how can 3,500,000 square kilometers of Chinese ocean territory
could be effectively supervised by China MSA on the basis of only 5 ocean-going
vessels and 2 helicopters? The author is of the opinion that it’s hard to fully
implement China MSA’s responsibility without sufficient and effective technical
supports, and that a comprehensive MDA system might be such a kind of supports.

Thirdly, the author would like to cite a statement: “Computers have been considered
as one of the most important inventions in the 20th century and the future technology
trends exclusively emphasize enhancement in human–computer interaction” (Wang
and Nelson, 2014, p.82). As discussed previously, existing Chinese platforms for ship
monitoring are not adequately integrated, effective or interactive enough. China MSA
is endeavoring to optimize IT systems with a view to increasing administrative
efficiency. Therefore, it’s necessary to consider developing a comprehensive MDA
system so as to implement China’s Maritime policies more effectively.

2

Comment by the author: The statistics exclude vessels and helicopters which belong to other agencies but may
be under MSA’s coordination in emergency situations. In addition, more helicopters and light aircrafts have been
or are expected to be served for China MSA after 2013.
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Last but not least, compared with EU, USA, Canada, or other countries and/or
intergovernmental organizations, capability of routine maritime surveillance of China
is still restricted in the coastal area or even port area. This capability obviously could
not meet the demand of shipping with loose restriction of geographical scope. For
example, several emergency cases, accidents or oil spills happening outside the
Chinese coastline, indicated that the demand is strong for MDA beyond the limitation
of coastline, territorial sea, contiguous zone and even the EEZ. It’s not hard to image
how the emergency responses would be facilitated if a MDA platform were provided
with detailed, reliable information on scenes at sea, in real time. Hence, to take the
responsibility of accident and/or pollution prevention, lifesaving, casualty
investigation, etc., China MSA has to improve its capability of MDA.
4.1.2 Feasibility analysis
Although getting a comprehensive overview of activities at sea was a challenge for
most countries, but now, with the development of technology and economy, the
feasibility of establishment of Chinese MDA system gradually becomes clear with the
discussion of previous chapters. The detailed information would not be repeated here,
instead, only key features are summarized as follows:
.1 technically speaking, global marine surveillance is possible with the help of
advanced technologies, such as remote sensing, radio communication, IT
(computing, high capacity of network, processing capability of huge scale of data,
etc.);
.2 case studies proved that it’s practicable to realize a comprehensive MDA
system by means of integrating multi-data sources, such as shore-based and
satellite-based AIS, LRIT, SAR1, etc.; and
.3 assessing from the present conditions of China MSA, establishing MDA
system is feasible because: (a) experience has been gained from independent
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systems for ship monitoring; (b) an overall IT system is under construction for
China MSA, providing potential support of hardware, data source and budget.
4.2 Expected benefits
Chinese MDA system, if established, will be expected to bring the following primary
benefits:

.1 improving China MSA’s performance, in other words, enhancing its
performance in maritime safety, security, facility and marine pollution prevention;
.2 sharing reliable and situational sketches of sea with relevant China’s
authorities such as Customs, immigration office, fishery agency, etc., which will
more or less promote their tasks too;
.3 providing appropriate information for stakeholders of shipping, such as ship
owners, seafarers, shipping agencies, etc., which will promote their business; and
.4 accelerating new working mode, for instance, “digital cruising” might partly
substitute traditional patrol vessel cruising, which will save a lot of human
resources and energy resources.
4.3 Expected functions
Since it only serves as tools for the research, the author would not discuss about too
much IT details in this section. Therefore regular functions of common software
would not be mentioned, instead, only primary functions related to maritime
governance are listed as follows:

.1 Display of ships’ positions. This is the most essential and important function
of a GIS-based MDA platform, providing the locations of ships at least within
China’s territorial sea. More detailed information of a target vessel could be
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indicated according to associated databases. An example of assumed interface is
illustrated in figure14.

.2 providing assistance for patrolling. Patrol ships could be marked on the
interface of the platform, and, if necessary, advices or instructions could be given
by appropriate means.
.3 Digital cruising. With the help of information capturing, data processing and
scene simulating, the platform operator or duty officer is supposed to perform
digital cruising simulating a patrol vessel navigates at sea. By doing so, violations,
close-quarters situations, or even pollutions could be found by MSA officers in
office. Figure 15 demonstrates 3D effect of intended digital cruising.
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.4 Anomaly detection for special areas. Here the concept of Anomaly is referred
the definition by Roy (2008), in the context of MDA as: “Something peculiar
(odd, curious, weird, bizarre, atypical) because it is inconsistent with or deviating
from what is usual, normal, or expected, or because it is not conforming to rules,
laws or customs”. For this function, a user-defined area could be set for drawing
particular attentions, and such area is supposed to be defined by means of
invoking standard definitions (e.g. territorial sea, etc.) or specifically plotting
geographical polygon. The author believes this function will facilitate timely
identification of special vessel in special area. For example, special attention
could be paid to a highlighted area with high risk of piracy attack, in line with the
concept of Information Distribution Facility (IDF) of LRIT (IMO, 2010b).

.5 Oil pollution detection. Guidance by IMO (2009c) suggests that oil pollutant
could be detected by means of eyesight observation, photographic and video
imagery, and active or passive remote sensing systems. A MDA platform is
expected to have function of oil pollution detection as well as targeted ship
identification via processing data with various sensors. For example, SAR1
images of LRIT and/or AIS might detect oil spill in time and lock the responsible
vessel. Figure 17 (A) shows a case of oil discharge detection.
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.6 Investigation assistance. As the example of oil spill investigation assumed in
4.3.5, a comprehensive MDA system with function of scenario replay and data
comparative analysis could contribute to accomplishing MSA’s tasks, such as
casualty investigation or safety investigation might.
.7 Providing information aids to navigation. Information such as meteorology,
oceanography, notices to mariners, etc. could be provided by the MDA system
with the aim of enhancing both the administrative decision-making and the
services to public.
.8 Pollutant drifting modelling. A MDA system could predict trend of oil
pollutant drifting based on reliable meteorological information, detected oil
features and data processing support (IMO, 2009c). Figure 17 (B) and (C)
illustrate the process of this function.
.9 Statistics and analysis. Searching the records of ships’ positons and displaying
it on GIS interface. By doing that for a specific period, the navigation routes and
ships density could be identified, which is believed to benefit Authorities’
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decision-makings, such as laying out fairway, traffic separation schemes, or
anchorage, etc.

4.4 Chapter summary
This chapter comprehensively analyzes the necessity, possibility, expected benefits
and intended functions of establishing Chinese MDA system. By means of
introducing of more information on Chinese status quo, both administrative reality
and IT development, necessity of establishing Chinese MDA is substantiated. The
author would like to remind the fact that it’s hard for China MSA to implement its
overall responsibilities of governing and serving vessels navigating away from
coastline, and that MDA system might probably improve this situation at least in the
field of maritime surveillance. The author believes it’s urgent to establish Chinese
MDA platform.

The feasibility of establishment of Chinese MDA is also validated through analyzing
successful cases abroad and IT development in China. Some potential benefits of
MDA are discussed in this chapter. Nine essential functions for a comprehensive
MDA system are supposed from perspective of maritime responsibilities and practical
tasks in China.
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Chapter 5 Introduction on relevant experiments

A comprehensive project should be performed step by step, especially when
innovative technology is involved. Conducting experiment is a good choice as
preliminary procedure, which would benefit subsequent research.
5.1 Experiments conducted by others
With the purpose of evaluating the capacity of satellite-based AIS, a project named as
PASTA MARE was conducted by EMSA. Technical theory implies that message
collision and receiver saturation are probably the main factors impacting the
performance of satellite-based AIS. Message on collision is caused by lacking of
synchronization since the SOTDMA protocol was designed only for VHF-range area
(please review section 2.2.1 for more details). Receiver saturation is the result of a
large amount of messages sending in high traffic density area (Luxspace Sarl, 2010).

However, this issue stayed in theoretical level until the PASTA MARE project was
conducted with aim of assessing real performance of space borne AIS. The project
was conducted in three phases throughout the 2 year study period, carrying out a
series of experiments based on shore-based and satellite-based AIS data (provided by
commercial company: Orbcomm, ComDev/ExactEarth and LuxSpace). Final
conclusions related to our research are summarized as follows (Luxspace Sarl, 2010):

.1 tracking and tracing vessels by means of satellite-based AIS is feasible;
.2 experiments revealed that the Probability of Detection (PoD) of satellite-based
AIS was not high enough and that the PoD’s performance on high sea was much
better than that in coastal area;
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.3 satellite-based AIS hardly meet surveillance requirement of hourly
refreshment rate3, so a combination of shore-based and satellite-based AIS might
be capable to satisfy the requirement;
.4 Satellite-based AIS could improve the overall MDA picture but it does not
meet all the demands of marine surveillance;
.5 other detection techniques, e.g. SAR1, are also needed for certain occasions,
such as small ship without AIS, switching off power supply with intention or not,
not visible by satellite, etc. and
.6 Polling function of LRIT is a powerful tool to obtain high-frequency position
messages, which facilitates the observation of vessels closely.

In fact, similar experiments have been conducted. For example, the Australian
Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) performed, based on ORBCOMM’s commercial
data, a satellite-based AIS performance trial between 25 June and 4 August 2009. This
experiment suggested that “AIS via satellite was useful for obtaining greater maritime
domain awareness” (IMO, 2009b).

Another experiment was carried out by Kazemi et al (2013) in Sweden as a part of
research on using open data for anomaly detection in maritime surveillance domain.
The term of open data refers to “the idea of making data freely available to use, reuse
or redistribute without any restriction”, which is mainly available from science and
government. It’s noted that professor Kazemi and his team members are of the
opinion: “Using today’s technology, continuous tracking of all maritime activities by a
single sensor is insufficient since it cannot monitor everything that happens in the
surveillance area” (the author believes this opinion strengthens the conclusion 3 of
PASTA MARE project). In this experiment, a dedicated system based on a proposed
framework and algorithms was developed. By using open data sources along with
3

The situation is supposed has been and will be improved as a result of technical development and more satellites
being launched as introduced in section 2.2.3.
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other traditional sources of data (e.g. AIS), the experimental system was operated to
monitor activities of vessels and to identify those with unusual behaviors. Validities of
the detection findings were verified by comparing the results of system operated by
Swedish Coastguard. After four weeks validation and subsequent analyzing, the
experiment concluded that “using open data will improve the efficiency of the
surveillance systems by increasing the accuracy and covering unseen aspects of
maritime activities”.
5.2 Experiment with the author’s participation
5.2.1 General information
With the purpose of comparing the performances of different sensors for ship
monitoring, Shanghai MSA cooperating with Shanghai Maritime University (SMU)
conducted an experiment in November 2013. The author participated in, as a
representative on behalf of Shanghai MSA, this research and would like to introduce
it. The experiment was composed of two items: (a) detection for fixed-area; (b)
detection on passage. The primary objective of experiment item (a) is to verify three
different types of SAR1 sensor and to compare them with LRIT’s detection; while
item (b) focuses on more sensors including satellite AIS, shipborne AIS terminal and
Bei Dou satellite4. The main sensors used in the experiment are listed in table 3.
Table 3: Sensors involved for the experiement conducted in November 2013
sensor
No.
1
2
3
4

on board *

on shore

Radar
AIS terminal
GPS
Bei Dou terminal

VTS
AIS

satellite-based
LRIT

AIS *

SAR
RadarSat-2
TerraSAR-X
Cosmo-Skymed

remark: * only involved in item (b) of the experiment

Source: Compiled by author

The exact location of item (a) is a square formed by geographic coordinates (30°48′ ~
4

Bei Dou is a Chinese satellite navigation system. The primary purpose of this satellite constellation is navigation
rather than communication or detection, and on AIS sensor mounted on the satellite. Thus it does not be considered
as a ship monitor data source in this paper. However, it should be noted that some Chinese vessels, both merchant
vessel and fishing boat, had fitted BeiDou terminal on board, so this is considered during the experiment in 2013.
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31°20′N and 122°10′E~ 122°47′E) nearby CJK anchorage, as shown in figure 19.
Item (b) is conducted, with assistance of MV “Yu Feng”- the training ship of SMU, on
a shipping line from Zhang Jia Gang, China to Pusan, Korea, as shown in figure 20.

5.2.2 Data sources and method
The experiment was performed on a basis of different data sources, such as LRIT, AIS,
and particularly SAR images. LRIT, VTS, shore-based AIS are data owned and
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maintained by MSA, so they are readily available; satellite-based AIS data was
provided by China Transport Telecommunications & Information Center (CTTIC)
contracting with ORBCOMM company; SAR data was relatively particular because it
is purchased from commercial company, so the experimental time was also decided in
compliance with the time windows of satellites.

As discussed in section 2.3, there are several distinct algorithms for SAR1. In this
experiment, an optimized modelling algorithm named K-distribution CFAR was
chosen since it might eliminate some false alarms generated by sea clutter. The basic
mathematic principles of K-distribution CFAR are listed as follows (Wang et al, 2013;
Pieralice et al, 2014; Peng and Shi, 2012; Amoon et al, 2013):

Function of relationship between probability density and intensity of image detection:

- average value，v- dimension perimeter，L- SAR image number，
function，

- Gamma

- (v-L) order modified Bessel function.

To detect ship targets based on K-distribution CFAR: firstly decide sea area as
background and calculate the intensity of image detection among the background area,
then work out the average value and variance by using the following functions.

- intensity of pixel detected，N- total amount of pixels in background window.
Applying the relationship function to shape parameter, average value and
variance as follows:
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v, the Shape parameter of K-distribution probability density could be calculated.
And then, solve the false alarm probability equation

- threshold of detection could be get. ( Pfa is false alarm probability, usually be
set from 10 -7to 10-9.
Finally, validity judgement for detected pixel XT could be made according to the
value of IC, with help of standard:
It could be identified as target pixel when
background pixel when

; while it would be recognized as

.

The coordinate system was another factor needed to be decided before conducting
experiment, because it would not only influence subsequent calculation for detected
targets (as shown in figure 21) but also impact the method of cross-correlation with
other data source of ship monitoring. The coordinates of “WGS84” was selected since
AIS is also based on this coordinates. Moreover, UTC (Coordinated Universal Time)
was used in the experiment.
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5.2.3 Result of the experiment
SAR1 images were got as expected and were compared with other data source of
sensors. The detecting result of SAR did not perform as well as a former experiment
carried out in the same area with 80% detecting rate (Peng and shi, 2012), however,
the author holds the opinion that it was still acceptable and valuable for further
research or project. Reception of LRIT data was relatively stable for both item (a) and
(b), but only for SOLAS-applied vessel as it required. The performance of
satellite-based AIS was not as good as expectation: with regard to item (a), AIS
transmitters were probably interfered by other VHF-frequency equipment and
occurring message collision with each other, since the ship density in waters of
Chinese coastline is very high; as to item (b), less than half of AIS signals of MV “Yu
Feng” were detected by satellite, one reason except message collision might be she
was out of the visibility scope of satellite. Deviation existed between Bei Dou and
GPS. Besides, cross-correlation and comparison were conducted, and examples of
them are illustrated in figure 22 and figure 23. More detailed information is available
in Appendix C.
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Result and inspiration of the experiment are summarized as:
.1 SAR1 is a suitable technique for ship detection, especially for those small ships
(LRIT and/or AIS equipment not fitted or working). Nonetheless, SAR1 could not
independently identify those detected targets;
.2 The performance of satellite-based AIS was not good enough to detect all
AIS-fitted vessels for the reasons which have been previously discussed or other
unrealized ones. However, it should be highlighted that shore-based AIS is a good
supplementary data source;
.3 LRIT presents relatively reliable communication capability, especially for
those vessels that are large in scale, in good maintenance or new-built ones5; and
.4 As mentioned above, VTS, shore-based AIS indicated they are suitable for
detection near coastline, but unfortunately, only near coastline.

5

For some other ships, LRIT function is realized by conventional Inmarsat-C terminals which also engaged for
other communications, e.g. GMDSS. It has been approved that the LRIT performances of such shared terminals
are significantly worse than those are dedicated used. And some of them are not easy to solve. Anyway, that’s
another complex issue to be further discussed in this paper, so it would be not debated, and many LRIT-related
documents are available in more details
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5.3 Chapter summary
This chapter introduces experiments conducted by others, e.g. the PASTA MARE
project and trial participated by the author. Those experiments are introduced with the
intention to verify that:
.1 different sensors for ship detections are of different advantages and
disadvantages, such as coverage, updated frequency, reliability, etc. In other words,
no one sensor could fulfill all requirements of a comprehensive MDA system;
.2 how potential data sources are decided in the following discussion; and
.3 specific structure of system, method of implementation and algorithm for
distinct sensor would impact the performance of a system, so they are needed to be
further analyzed for individual system during the establishing process.
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Chapter 6 Proposed solutions

Taking into account of discussions in the previous chapters, and especially
considering about the Top-Down Design Strategy for China MSA’s IT development as
well as documents of EMSA for construction of its IT platform, some preliminary
solutions to China MDA system are proposed in this chapter. It’s noted that numerous
specified technical specifications would be adopted if such a comprehensive MDA
system were established. Thus, some essential technical contents about IT are going to
be covered in this chapter with a view to not preparing for a real project but to
providing suggestions by the author.
6.1 General principles
(i) As mentioned above, the overall system of China MSA is under construction
according to the Top-Down Design Strategy at present. Thus the primary principle is
that the MDA system should be a subsystem under the overall one, meaning that
infrastructure should meet Top-Down Design technical requirements. For example, the
platform shall be built on SOA architecture through using ESB technology. Moreover,
the MSA system should be able to exchange data and to input and/or output services
with other subsystems (China MSA, 2011).

(ii) The to-be-established MDA system should reuse the existing systems as many as
possible and not impact those keep-operating subsystems, so as to control cost.

(iii) It’s important for the Chinese MDA system to follow common standards on
process management and interfaces to ensure that other data source, services or
processes might be added in future. Thus it should be designed as an extensible and
scalable technical platform.
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(iv) The author agrees the fact that “Governments for over a decade attempt to publish
government data online and make them publicly accessible, readily available,
understandable and usable” (Kazemi et al, 2013). So, the system should be designed
not only for MSA user but also for public customers.

(v) Data in MDA system might be MSA-owned, depending on purchase or open data
as described in section 5.1. Different data sources should be used to the maximum
extent, playing individual role according to its characteristics in the MDA platform.

(vi) Knowledge-driven or so called as rule-driven approaches should be adopted in the
initial stage of MDA system’s operation, while the primary approach might be
replaced by data-driven mode when adequate data is accumulated. In other words, the
decision rules of the system might gradually changes from human-dependent mode to
big data dependent one.
6.2 Data resources to be integrated
To decide what external information should be integrated as data source for Chinese
MDA system, the author holds the view that some essential factors should be taken
into account:

.1 data’s features to meet the demands of intended functions, such as coverage,
update frequency, probability of detection, reliability, and vessels applied to;
.2 availability of the data (readily available, dependence on purchase or
importing from other platforms);
.3 data’s content and format; and
.4 other elements needed to be considered, e.g. commercial confidentiality and/or
sensitivity of the data.
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Bearing in mind the above considerations, the author list features of some potential
data resources are listed in table 4. In addition, more detailed information is attached
in Appendix D.

Table 4: Essential features of potential data resources for Chinese MDA system
data
source

update
frequency

content & format

extraction means

shore-based
2s – 3min
AIS

static and dynamic
could be derectly
information of vessel;
imported from
text message-standard
database of MSA
data format

depends on
geogrophical
satellite- position and
based AIS capability of
commercial
provider, etc.

primary danymic and
static information ;
standard data format

LRIT

VTS

about 1 min

Integrated
administrati
on system /
ship
registration
system

CHISREP
additional
services

cover A1 sea area,
terminal fitted ships

subjected to contract nearly golbal coverage

6 hours basically,
identification, positions,
less intervals
time of transmision
LRIT data center
subjected to
standard data format
request

SAR

coverage/applicability

basically danymic
information.
encrypted data

applies to vessels
required as SOLAS,
data of foreign vessels
subjected to requests

extracted from
dedicated VTS
port area,
system
subjected to contract,
subjected to
dynamic data;
but data needs
nearly golbal coverage
contract
imagery format
conversion and
further processing
detail information for: all
vessels flying the flag of
ship particulars,
China, other ships which
could be derectly
static data in detail, part
have been visited in
N/A
imported from
of dynamic information.
China.
database of MSA
standard data format
Basic data for vessels
other than above from
Lloyd's database etc.
could be derectly
depends on
voyage information,
for ships sailing into
imported from
voyage status
basically dynamic data
reporting lines
database of MSA
oceanographic and
depends on
some of them are
nearly golbal coverage
meteorological data,
different provider
open data
and all vessels
standard format

reliability
high, except high
density area

readily
available

medium, (lower
than shore-based
AIS)

to be
purchased

high for most ships;
medium for nonreadily
dedicated
available
Inmarsat-C
terminals
high

readily
available

high under most
circumstances

to be
purchased

high

readily
available

low (actually, small readily
amount of data)
available
high or medium

Source: Compiled by author based on cellected information, experiment and experience

Based on the above analyses and discussions of previous chapters (including the
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availibility

could be
collected on
free basis

introduction of individual technique’s characteristics, the demand for maritime
surveillance

with

near-seamless-coverage

and

near-real-time-awareness,

and

experiences gained from leading cases as well as participated experiment), the author
suggests “core” data to be integrated into Chinese MDA, including:

.1 ship position, i.e. information of latitude and longitude and the time stamp of
the transmission;
.2 ship identification, by means of IMO number (shall be set as primary key for
relational database), MMSI numbers, as well as Name, Call Sign and Flag of
ship;
.3 ship and cargo detailed information (the availability might depend on the flag
and voyage of the vessel);
.4 ship detection information derived from SAR images;
.5 oil pollution information detected by SAR image and/or other instruments; and
.6 oceanographic and meteorological information.

Accordingly, data sources would be extracted from other IT system, external provider
or open data resources might include but not limited to: shore-based AIS, LRIT, VTS,
satellite-based AIS, SAR, integrated administration system and open data resources
(e.g. oceanographic and meteorological information).
6.3 Data fusion
As analyzed above, to establish a comprehensive MDA system, key data from
different sensors are needed. Moreover, Detsis et al (2012) believe that one of largest
problem with comprehensive maritime surveillance is that sensors are not globally
standardized with regard to sharing information. Therefore, the process of data fusion
becomes an important step to achieve an effective MDA system. Data fusion “aims to
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process multiple sets of data gathered from multiple sources, in order to build a
holistic view of the environment” (Nilsson et al, 2012, p.60). In order to provide the
most up-to-date and reliable maritime traffic picture, a MDA system has to fuse ship
monitoring information abstracted from sensors (e.g. AIS, LRIT, VTS, etc.) and
combine them with data from existing databases (e.g. ship registration system, as
discussed in the previous section) in a consistent manner. A lot of researches have
been done with the intention to develop and improve data fusion models.
Notwithstanding some technical difficulties might be encountered in designing
distinct measures for data fusion, it has been proved that it’s possible to achieve the
goal of data fusion by implementing a series of processes (such as detection,
association, correlation, estimation, combination, user-refinement, optimization, etc.)
based on mathematics, algorithm and modeling (Peng et al, 2010; Nilsson et al, 2012;
Gómez-Romero et al, 2015).

Since data fusion is a systemic and complex technology supported by a series of
fundamental theories, it’s beyond the scope of this paper. Moreover, recalling that a
practical case of experiment and corresponding data fusion has been introduced in
section 5.2, we will spare no specific discussion on data fusion technology.
Alternatively, some basic opinions on data fusion would be expressed. With regard to
the demand of Chinese MDA system, the author consider that the selected data
sources in previous section should be integrated into the system as far as possible, and
that some key points for the integration might be (Peng et al, 2010; Nilsson et al,
2012):

.1 three primary procedures for data fusion might be grouped as data collection,
data modelling and data analysis;
.2 efforts should be made to harmonizing coordinate system, time to be stamped,
identification verifying, position correction, information correlation, and so on;
.3 data sources selected to be integrated do not mean they should be always used
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everywhere, in contrast, some of data sources might be only ordered when
necessary. For instance, surveillance of EEZ might need only combination of
satellite-based AIS and LRIT, or coupled with low solution image of SAR1
ordinarily, but high solution image of SAR1 must be purchased to provide high
level information service in emergency; and
.4 it’s better to continuously improve method and/or modelling of MDA system’s
data fusion, and system operators as well as experts of MSA are conductive to
this process.

An example structure of Chinese MDA system data fusion is demonstrated in figure
24. In addition, a schematic view of the user-fusion model is shown in figure 25,
which illustrates different levels of data fusion processes and its relationship with
user’s optimization.

Processing of all data sources
Correlation with
ship particulars

VTS

Collection of related
open data

Shore-based
AIS

SAR

Display in GIS-based
user interface

Satellite-based
AIS

LRIT

For
Chinese
Vessels
only

Port area

Territorial sea

EEZ

High sea

Figure 25:Demonstration of data used for monitoring different areas in Chinese MDA
Source: compiled by author
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6.4 System design
Considering the principal design for Chinese MDA system, the author believes two
essential elements should be reviewed, i.e. the infrastructure of China MSA’s
Top-Down design and the basic functions of MDA platform. As to the Top-Down
design, the author hopes it has been basically understood after reading the
introduction in section 3.4.2 as well as figure 14. With regard to the second element,
nine intended functions have been described in section 4.3 from a perspective of
application. Since this section focuses on system design, primary functions of a MDA
platform need to be discussed below in terms of IT.

The basic technical functionalities of Chinese MDA system might include (EMSA,
2010):

.1 Data Exchange: data could be provided by or transmitted to other operational
applications under China MSA’s overall IT system as well as potential external
systems;
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.2 Data Management and Access: Chinese MDA system should be able to
identify each type of data and its provider and to store and manage both
independent and integrated data;
.3 Processing of data, including consolidation, correlation, fusion and enrichment
of different data sources, as briefly discussed in the former section;
.4 Dissemination: the processed data is distributed to the users, via
system-to-system interfaces and visually using the integrated portal of China
MSA; and
.5 Federated services: the platform shall allow the management of the
applications in a rationalized and effective way. Such horizontal services may
include but are not limited to: (i) user management and access control; (ii) data
management; (iii) service management; (iv) security; (v) application monitoring;
and (vi) logging. And it’s noted that such federated services are basically subject
to the unified design and construction of overall IT system of China MSA.

The proposed Chinese MDA system shall be in compliance with Top-Down design
strategy of China MSA, meaning that it should be developed under SOA architecture.
The relationship between Chinese MDA platform and the overall IT system is
illustrated in figure 26.

As discussed in previous chapters, MDA system, if to be established, would not be an
independent system but a subsystem interacting with other applications and/or
databases. This means that there is no need to consider too much of some elements for
conventional IT system development, such as hardware, storage, security, etc. Instead,
development of Chinese MDA system should concentrate on data and services which
would input from or output to other components. In order to interpret this idea clearly,
figure 27 is compiled and provided below, demonstrating the working principle of
data processing module as an example.
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Overall IT system of China MSA

Public services portal

Comprehensive administration portal

—facing external user

—facing internal user

Applications / Work flow engine

Presentation
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Business Flow Manager

Business
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SOAP

A
I 。。。
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Aid to navigation
system

Legislation

Administration
system

CHISREP

survey

seafarer

regisration

。。。

L
R
I
T

Portal
layer

RMI

HR

JMS and other protocols

。。。
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MDA
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ESB (Enterprise Service Bus)
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Ship
。。。 Open
particulars
data
Time
Rank
Organ
demonsion dimension demonsion

Company
。。。

data
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Internal
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cargo
。。。
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Figure 27: Illustration of relationship between Chinese MDA platform and overall IT system
Source: compiled by author taking account of Top-Down design strategy
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ESB / Interface

Multi-data Processing Component
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Information tagging

LRIT
Satellite-AIS
VTS
SAR

Multi
Data
Source
ingestion

Data storage & archive

Data transformation

Data distribution

Data consolidation

Information enrichment

Data fusion

Display preparation

Data
output to
dedicated
database

Ship
particulars
Open data

Figure 28: Demonstration of data processing component for MDA platform
Source: compiled by author referring document of EMSA
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Processed
data

6.5 Chapter summary
In summary, this chapter proposes solution for developing Chinese MDA system
taking into account of analyses of previous chapters and IT strategy of China MSA.
Six general principles for establishing Chinese MDA platform are suggested. By
means of analyzing demands of MDA’s function and comparing data features of
potential resources, the research identifies seven essential data source for MDA
system in this chapter. Furthermore, based on the author’s experience, knowledge and
learning gained from other researches, fundamental principles and suggested instances
are provided for processes of data fusion and system design, and some graphical
interpretations are presented so as to further explain ideas of the author.
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Chapter 7 Conclusion

It’s been a consensus that shipping is an important industry with long history. While
along with the development of technologies and the growing consciousness of marine
conservation, significant changes are gradually taking place in this traditional sector.
Technical innovations not only occurred in marine transporting but also presented in
the patterns of maritime administration. This paper concentrates on improving the
effectiveness of China’s maritime surveillance with the help of modern technologies.
In order to conduct an all-around and objective research, the following contents are
discussed.

(i) Necessity: By reviewing relevant international conventions, such as UNCLOS,
SOALS, MARPOL, as well as Chinese domestic laws related to marine affairs, it’s
proved that establishing MDA system is not only supported by current
legislations but also encouraged as a means to fully implement obligations of
Contracting Government. The status quo of China’s maritime administration is
illustrated via listing statistics of ship registration, maritime trade, marine
territory and available resources of China MSA, which implies that it’s urgent for
China to create a comprehensive mechanism for realizing effective marine
surveillance. In other words, it’s hard to fulfill China MSA’s responsibilities
outside the coastal area on a basis of existing resources, i.e. number of staff,
patrolling vessel, helicopter, etc. For example, how could 3.5 million km2 of
ocean territory is effectively supervised by only a few of ocean-going vessels and
helicopters? And how could timely response be made to non-innocent passage,
marine accident or oil spill under the condition of few-awareness at sea? Thus,
the author believes establishing MDA system is one of the efficient measures to
deal with the difficult situation at present.
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(ii) Feasibility: Besides the possibility in term of legislation, other aspects for
establishment of Chinese MDA system are also analyzed in the paper. First of all,
from perspective of technology, it’s possible to obtain a complete recognized
maritime picture with the help of communication and information techniques
such as SAR1 remote sensing, satellite-based AIS, etc. Secondly, with respect to
existing cases, some typical projects which have been done or are under
construction, verifying the feasibility of a comprehensive MDA system. Last but
not least, it’s achievable to develop such a MDA platform under current
conditions of China MSA, for some independent marine detection systems, e.g.
LRIT, shore-based AIS, have been operating in China. On the other hand, an
overall IT system of China MSA is under construction by guidance of Top-Down
design strategy, which provides necessary resources such as hardware, data, and
budget.
(iii) Proposed solutions: As the key point of this paper, some primary solutions to
establishment Chinese MDA system are proposed on the fundament of
knowledge and understandings learned from researches, projects and experiments
performed by others, as well as the experience gained from a former experiments
participated by the author. Those solutions cover essential processes of platform
development. i.e.: general principles of developing Chinese MDA system;
primary functions of the system, from the perspectives of both practical
applications and technical implementation; selected data sources for Chinese
MDA platform are suggested; principle and method of data fusion are suggested,
and general design of MDA, as a component of overall IT system, is also
proposed in this paper.

In conclusion, numerous vessels are navigating on the waters under the jurisdiction of
China, so it’s necessary to be aware of activities and statuses of those ships, although
there might be long distance away from coastline and in dynamic situation. However,
by taking advantage of monitoring from multi-sensors and integrating of data from
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multi-sources, it’s definitely possible to be aware of situational pictures at sea. It
should be noted that the solutions to establishment MDA system are not proposed as a
subsequent project specification; instead, they are proposed with intention to draw
more attentions to considering the establishment of Chinese MDA system and to
illustrate the feasibility of establishing such a system as well as the conformity with
IT development strategy of China MSA.
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Appendix A

Relevant provisions of conventions and laws supporting maritime surveillance
Convention/
Law

UNCLOS

Article
• Article 17
• Article 18
• Article 19
• Article 21
• Article 22
• Article 24
• Article 25

Apply to

Sea area

Within
Territorial
Sea

All ships

• Article 56
• Article 96
• Article 110
• Article 111
Chapter V
• Article 11
• Article 12

SOLAS

• Article 19-1

• Article 19.2

SAR2
Convention

Chapter V,
etc.

EEZ
Government
Ship
War ship or
Government
ship
Governmental
Authorities;
applicable ships
Applicable ships
(basically
international
voyage)
Applicable ships
(basically
international
voyage)
Governmental
Authorities;
applicable ships

Characteristics of
maritime surveillance
To provide, guarantee and identify
the right of innocent passage;
To set up sea lanes and traffic
separation schemes, etc.
Sovereign right and jurisdiction
right
immunity

High sea

Waters
under
jurisdiction

Ship reporting system;
Vessel traffic services (VTS).

all

Requirement related to LRIT

all

Requirement related to AIS

Waters
under
jurisdiction

61

Right of visit;
Right of hot pursuit.

Ship reporting system

MARPOL

Law of the
People’s
Republic of
China on the
Territorial
Sea and the
Contiguous
Zone

Annex I
• Article 15
• Article 34;
Annex II
• Article 13;
Annex III
• Article 7
• Article 34
Annex IV
• Article 11;
Annex V
• Article 3
• Article 4
• Article 5
• Article 6;
Annex VI
• Chapter 3

Law on the
Exclusive
Economic
Zone and the
Continental
Shelf of the
People’s
Republic of

Applicable ships

• Article 6
• Article 8
• Article 9
• Article 10
• Article 11

Foreign ships

• Article 13

Government
authorities

• Article 14

Waters
under
jurisdiction

Within
Territorial
Sea

in the
contiguous
zone
In the
territorial
sea,
contiguous
zone, or
outside the
aforesaid
area

Ships served for
military purpose
or government

• Article 3
• Article 4
• Article 8
• Article 10
• Article 12

Government
authorities

• Article 7
• Article 9

Organization or
individual

Economic
Zone and
the
Continental
Shelf
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Prescribe specific discharge
standards and marine environmental
protection requirements, and also
empower authorities of Member
States to enact superintendence such
as pollution detection, ship’s activity
monitoring, marine environmental
protection.

right of innocent passage;
necessary actions could be taken in
order to prevent and stop
non-innocent passage;
sanctions against violations;
To set up sea lanes and traffic
separation schemes, etc.

Exercise control measures

Enact the right of hot pursuit
subjected to prescribed conditions

Sovereign right and jurisdiction;
Right of visit;
Right of hot pursuit, etc.

Activities should be subjected to
approval and under governance of

China

competent authorities

Maritime
Traffic Safety
Law

• Article 14

Marine
Environment
Protection
Law

• Article 5
• Article 19
• Article 67
• Article 71
• Article 72

Ship and her
owner and/or
operator

Waters
under
jurisdiction

ships

Waters
under
jurisdiction

Empower competent authorities
(MSA) to promulgate special
regulations with a view to the
governance of vessel traffic
Give rights to competent authorities
(MSA) to supervise, investigate and
inspect vessels;
Set obligation to competent
authorities (MSA) to monitor
marine pollution from ship and
response report of pollution

Source: Compiled by author based on provisions of relevant conventions and laws6.

6

: Detailed information is listed in Reference.
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Appendix B

Existing independent IT systems being used by China MSA
No.

Name

Basic function

Structure

Usage status

Category A: Maritime administration systems
About 100 registry

1

Maintenance of ship name,

Browser/server

departments within

ship registration

management of registration

(B/S)

Branch Bureaus.

system

procedures, identification

Distributed

162 registry

card, issuing certificate, etc.

deployment

departments within
Regional Bureaus

Ship
identification
2

number
management

Whole processes management
for Ship identification number

B/S
Centralized
deployment

system

3

administration
system

4

implementation
system

5

6

Ship

survey

Regional Bureaus.

inspection, pollution

Whole process management
of PSC

B/S

Branch Bureaus.

Distributed

1806 registry

deployment

departments within
Regional Bureaus

B/S
Deployed in
Liaoning MSA

Authorized PSC
offices

B/S &

620 authorized survey

management

of survey

Client/server(C/S)

agencies

Management for

Registered surveyor’s

surveyor system

examination, certification, etc.

management
system
(sea-going)
Seafarers

8

Branch Bureaus and

Whole process management

Seafarers
7

departure of port, Flag State
prevention operation, etc.

PSC

Departments of

964 sites within

Approval for entry and

Integrated

Ship owner;

management
system
waters)

(inner

B/S
Deployed in
China MSA

Training, examination,

B/S

certification, maintenance,

Centralized

etc.

deployment

Training, examination,

B/S

certification, maintenance,

Distributed

etc.

deployment
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Five pilot sites

56 authorized
authorities/agencies

Regional Bureaus

Seafarers
9

examination

Local area

Examination, questions

network

system
Seafarers
10

B/S

passport

Issue seafarers’ passports

management
Information

13

services web for

Publishing information

Centralized

14

Recruitment information

seafarers web

service

Management of

Approval for pollution

pollution

prevention operation, on spot

prevention

inspection, emergency

system

response management
and

passenger
management
system
Ship

15

card

management
system

16

Distributed

Declaration of

B/S

cargo/passenger, safety

Distributed

inspection, etc.

deployment

Processing management of
ship card

Centralized

settling, etc.

deployment

Decision-making support,

B/S & C/S,

safety status monitoring,

Distributed

information analysis

deployment

condition

Internal website

External website

Registration offices

deployment

charging system

Approval of

Branch Bureaus

B/S

Distributed

emergency

Branch Bureaus

deployment

receipt management, account

manage system

20

B/S

administrative

assistance under

Seafarers

deployment

B/S & C/S,

Navigation

19

Centralized

Fee charging operation,

system

18

B/S

Maritime

Command
17

Seafarers

deployment

Recruitment for

Cargo

Branch Bureaus

B/S

seafarers
12

Centralized
deployment

system
11

Examination sites

Branch Bureaus

MRCCs

project

on/under water,

C/S

promulgating notice to

Branch Bureaus

mariners
Web portal of China MSA
(internal network)

B/S
Centralized
deployment

Web portal of China MSA
(external network)

Employees of China
MSA

B/S
Centralized

The public

deployment

Category B: Aids to navigation / Maritime surveillance systems
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21

22

23

LRIT system

AIS system

CHISREP

LRIT service and corresponding
management

C/S

LRIT NDC of China,

Centralized

Several authorized

deployment

users

B/S, 4 regional

Ship detection and replay

center

historical record

deployed

Reporting ship voyage

Shanghai MSA

information

AIS data center and
Other users
MSA

Category C: internal administrative systems

24

Legislation
system
Human

25

resource
system

B/S
Legal issues management

Distributed
deployment

Information maintain, search,
etc.

arrangement

B/S
Distributed

Branch Bureaus

deployment

Project
26

Branch Bureaus

B/S
Project management

Distributed

system

Branch Bureaus

deployment

Category D: other system
Maritime
27

comprehensive

Statistics and analyzing of

statistics

maritime business

B/S
Centralized

Branch Bureaus

deployment

system

Source: compiled by author by taking account of Top-Down design of China MSA
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Appendix C

Details of experiment carried out by the author in cooperation with Dr. Wang S. Z. and Dr.
Peng J. et al in November 2013. The source of figures and tables in this appendix are all from
reports of the experiment.

Item (a): Area Detection
1. Experiment period
Collecting data twice: 11-11-2013, 24-11-2013
2. Area to be detected by distinct SAR1 mounted on satellites
Chose the period that satellites RadarSAT2、TerraSAR-X、Cosmo-Skymed passing the target
area at nearly same time, as shown in figure C-1, figure C-2, table C-1 and table C-2.

Anchorage
RadarSAT
2
TerraSARX
Cosmo

Figure C-1: Illustration of satellites passing on 11-11-2013
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Anchorage
RadarSAT
2
TerraSARX
Cosmo

Figure C-2: Illustration of satellites passing on 24-11-2013
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Table C-1: Parameters of related satellites, 11-11-2013 (coordinates: WGS84)
No.

Shooting
Satellite

Mode

Strip_ID

period

Resolution

incident

Detection area

coverage

ratio

angle

（NW, NE, SW, SE） (km)

grade
time (s)

31°21'N/122°18'E,
1

2013-11-11
RadarSAT2

Fine

30860

31°17'N/122°48'E,
7.5

SSG

8m

43.61

21:43:15:69

50×50
30°54'N/122°13'E,
30°50'N/122°42'E
31°20’N/122°27’E,

2

149/
TerraSAR-X

2013-11-11

SM

31°17’N/122°45’E,
10

Strip_009R

EEC

3m

35.287

21:53:44.73

30×50
30°53’N/122°21’E,
30°50’N/122°40’E
31°15’N/122°15’E,

3

COSMO

2013-11-11
Himage

-SkyMed-1

34791

31°19’N/122°40’E,
5.822

EC

21:36:13.06

3m

32.276

40 ×40
30°54’N/122°19’E,
30°58’N/122°45’E
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Table C-2: Parameters of related satellites, 24-11-2013 (coordinates: WGS84)
No.

Shooting
Satellite

Mode

Strip_ID

period

Resolution

incident

Detection area

coverage

ratio

angle

（NW, NE, SW, SE）

(km)

grade
time (s)

31°12'N/122°20'E,
2013-11-24
1

RadarSAT2

Ultra fine

31039

31°14'N/122°32'E,
3

SSG

3m

27.09

09:45:40.12

20×20
31°02'N/122°23'E,
31°04'N/122°34'E
31°19’N/122°13’E,

2013-11-24
2

TerraSAR-X

SM

5

31°22’N/122°32’E,
10

EEC

3m

31.020

09:44:15.73

30×50
30°53’N/122°19’E,
30°56’N/122°37’E
31°21’N/122°16’E，

Cosmo-SkyMed
3
-4

31°18’N/122°38’E，

2013-11-24
Himage

16505

5.93

EC

09:28:40.90

3m

53.940

40 ×40
30°59’N/122°13’E，
30°56’N/122°34’E
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3. Experimental data
3.1 meteorology (24-11-2013)

Figure C-3: Illustration of wave at 2013-11-24 09:00（UTC）
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3.2 remote sensing (SAR1 images)

Figure C-4: SAR image of Cosmo-Skymed-4,2013-11-24 09:28:46-09:28:54（UTC）
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Figure C-5: SAR image of RadarSAT-2,2013-11-24 09:45:40.12（UTC）
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Figure C-6: SAR image of TerraSAR-X,2013-11-24 09:44:15.73（UTC）
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3.3 LRIT
Table C-3: ships detected by LRIT（2013-11-24 08:00~10:00UTC）
IMO

SHIP_NAME

SHIP_FLAG UTC_TO_LRIT_TIME_STAMP(TIME) LONGITUDE LALTITUDE

8404381

XIANHU

CHN

2013-11-24T08:42:00.000Z

122.7758

31.01

9672569

JIN HAI LAN

CHN

2013-11-24T08:50:00.000Z

122.5639

30.76528

9643752

ZHONG YU 1

CHN

2013-11-24T09:22:00.000Z

122.6358

31.02194

9198111

OOCL SHANGHAI

HKG

2013-11-24T09:24:00.000Z

122.6153

30.7825

9332729

GLORY FORTUNE

HKG

2013-11-24T09:26:00.000Z

122.6919

31.09389

9216975

RUI NING 1

CHN

2013-11-24T09:46:00.000Z

122.4825

31.28778

9101792

SITC PYEONGTAEK

HKG

2013-11-24T09:52:00.000Z

122.5292

30.90111
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Figure C-7: Historical replay of LRIT , 2013-11-24 06:00~12:00（UTC）

76

Item (b) Detection on Passage
1. Factors of trial ship and her voyage
Ship name: MV “Yu Feng”
IMO：8822038
Call Sign：BPQX
MMSI：412049010
Experimental period：from 7 November 2013 to 9 November 2013
Voyage:：from Zhang Jia Gang, China to Pusan, Korea.
2. Experiment plan
（1）Wu Song Kou, as shown in figure C-8.
（2）Pusan, as shown in figure C-9.

TerraSAR

Figure C-8: Detection area of TerraSAR-X，2013-11-07，09:52:39（UTC）, Wu Song Kou,
MV “Yu Feng”: 31°30'44.82"N, 121°23'33.42"E（2013-11-07 09:52:39UTC）
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Cosmo

Figure C-9: Detection area of Cosmo-Skymed-4, 2013-11-08，20:18:51（UTC）, Pusan,

MV “Yu Feng”: 34°36'42.78"N, 128°48'22.50"E（2013-11-08 20:18:52UTC）

78

Table C-4: Parameters of related satellites, 2013-11-07~2013-11-08 (coordinates: WGS84)
No
.

Satellite

Mode

Strip_ID

period

Shooting
time (s)

grade

Resolutio incident

Detection area

coverage

n ratio

（NW, NE, SW, SE）

(km)

angle

31°43’N/121°16’E,
1 TerraSAR-X SM

81/

20131107

Strip012R 09:52:39

10

EEC

3m

35.287

31°46’N/121°35’E,
31°17’N/121°22’E,

30×50

31°19’N/121°40’E
34°44’N/128°24’E,
2

COSMO
-SkyMed-4

Himage 16275

2013-11-08
20:18:52.57

5.822

EC

3m

32.276

34°50’N/128°47’E,
34°23’N/128°32’E,
34°29’N/128°55’E
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40 40

3. Experimental data
3.1 meteorology (7 Nov 2013~8 Nov 2013)

Figure C-10: Illustration of wave at 7-11 2013-11-07 09:00（UTC）
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3.2 Remote sensing

Figure C-11: Image from satellite SAR of TerraSAR-X, 2013-11-07 09:52:39

（UTC）,Wu Song Kou

81

Figure C-12: Image from satellite SAR Cosmo-Skymed-4，2013-11-08 20:18:52.57
（UTC）, Pusan, Korea.
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3.3 Screenshot of AIS on “Yu Feng”, (blue one is signal of MV/“Yu Feng”)

Figure C-13:

Screenshot of AIS on “Yu Feng”, 2013-11-07 09:52:39（UTC）, Wu
Song Kou area,
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Figure C-14:

Screenshot of AIS onboard of “Yu Feng” on the waters of Pusan,
2013-11-08 20:18:52.57（UTC）
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3.4 Tracking by GPS onboard of MV/ Yu Feng

Figure C-15: tracking of MV/Yu Feng, 2013-11-07~2013-11-09
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3.5Tracking of MV/ Yu Feng by LRIT system of China NDC

Figure C-16: Tracking of MV/Yu Feng by LRIT, 2013-11-07~2013-11-09
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Table C-5: Position reports of MV/Yu Feng in LRIT, 2013-11-07~2013-11-09

IMO

SHIP_NAME SHIP_FLAG UTC_TO_LRIT_TIME_STAMP(TIME) LONGITUDE LATITUDE

8822038 YU FENG

CHN

2013-11-07T06:00:00.000Z

120.8792

31.90667

8822038 YU FENG

CHN

2013-11-07T12:00:00.000Z

121.8067

31.28778

8822038 YU FENG

CHN

2013-11-07T18:00:00.000Z

123.1972

31.46861

8822038 YU FENG

CHN

2013-11-08T00:00:00.000Z

124.4825

32.36444

8822038 YU FENG

CHN

2013-11-08T06:22:00.000Z

125.7206

33.20917

8822038 YU FENG

CHN

2013-11-08T12:22:00.000Z

127.1039

34.03

8822038 YU FENG

CHN

2013-11-08T18:22:00.000Z

128.5644

34.48333

8822038 YU FENG

CHN

2013-11-09T00:21:19.000Z

129.0833

35.10306
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3.6 Tracking of MV/Yu Feng by satellite-based AIS

Figure C-17: Tracking of MV/Yu Feng by satellite-based AIS,
2013-11-07~2013-11-09
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3.7 Tracking of MV/Yu Feng by Bei Dou satellite

Figure C-18: Tracking of MV/Yu Feng by Bei Dou satellite, 2013-11-07~2013-11-09
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Appendix D

Detailed information of different data sources
Table D-1: Intervals of AIS reporting, Class-A shipborne mobile equipment
reporting intervals
Ship’s dynamic conditions

Nominal reporting interval

Ship at anchor or moored and not moving faster
than 3 knots
Ship at anchor or moored and moving faster than
3 knots
Ship 0-14 knots
Ship 0-14 knots and changing course
Ship 14-23 knots
Ship 14-23 knots and changing course
Ship > 23 knots
Ship > 23 knots and changing course
Source: IALA, 2004

3 min
10 s
10s
3 1/3 s
6s
2s
2s
2s

Table D-2: Intervals of AIS reporting, equipment other than Class A shipborne
mobile equipment reporting intervals
Platform.s condition
Class B shipborne mobile equipment not moving
at faster than 2 knots
Class B shipborne mobile equipment moving at
2-14 knots
Class B shipborne mobile equipment moving at
14-23 knots
Class B shipborne mobile equipment moving >
at 23 knots
Search and rescue aircraft (airborne mobile
equipment)
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Nominal reporting interval
3 min
30s
15s
5s
10s

Aids to navigation
AIS base station

3 min
10s
Source: IALA, 2004

Table D-3: Dynamic and static information of AIS (shore-based)
information
content
Message ID
Repeat Indicator

Static information

description
Identifier for this message (1, 2 or 3)
0-3. Used by the repeater to indicate how many

content

Range of value

Message ID

5

Repeat Indicator

0-3

times the message has been repeated; default = 0;
3 = do not repeat again.
User ID

MMSI number (Unit serial number as substitute)

User ID

Navigation

0 = underway using engine; 1 = at anchor; 2 = not

AIS version

status

under command; 3 = restricted maneuverability; 4

indicator

0-3

= constrained by draught; 5 = moored; 6 =
aground; 7 = engaged in fishing; 8 = underway
sailing; 9 = (reserved for HSC category); 10 =
(reserved for WIG category); 15=Default
Rate of
turn(ROT)
SOG

±708 degrees/min. (-128 indicates not available

IMO number

which is the default)
Speed Over Ground in 1/10 knot steps (0 -102.2

Call sign

knots) 1023 = not available; 1022 = 102.2 knots
or higher
Position

1 = High (<10m. Differential mode of e.g.

accuracy

DGNSS receiver); 0 = Low (> 10m; Autonomous
mode of e.g. GNSS receiver or other electronic
position fixing device); default = 0
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Name

1-999999999

Longitude

Longitude in 1/10 000 minute (±180 degrees, East
= positive, West = negative); 181 degrees = not

Type of ship and
cargo type

available = default
Latitude

Latitude in 1/10 000 minute ( ±90 degrees, North
= positive, South = negative); 91 degrees = not

Dimension/reference
for position

available = default
COG

Course Over Ground in 1/10 degree (0 – 3599);
3600 = not available = default

Type of electronic

0-15

position fixing
device

True heading

Degrees (0-359) (511 indicates not available =

ETA

default
Time stamp

UTC second when the report was generated

Maximum present

(0-59,) or 60 - if time stamp is not available

static draught

which should also be the default) or 61 - if the
electronic position fixing system is in manual
input mode; or 62 -if the positioning systems is in
estimated [dead reckoning] mode, or 63 - if the
positioning system is inoperative.
Regional
Application

Reserved for definition by a competent regional

Destination

authority. Shall be set to 0, if not used for regional
application.

RAIM Flag

(Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring) flag
of electronic position fixing
device; 0= RAIM not in use = default; 1 = RAIM
in use.

Source: IALA, 2004
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Spare

0-255

Table D-4: Essential data for VTS7
Data item

Format & range of value

TrackID
Time
Latitude
Longitude
Course
Speed

Text, 1-999999999

Draught
Call sign
Ship Name
Info

Table D-6: SAR1 data

Table D-5: data of LRIT

Content

Content

Value range

Track Id

IMO number
Position

Value range

Text, 1-999999999

Text, 1-999999999

Position

Report Time

Report Time

7

Since VTS is a relatively high-integrated system and different VTS manufactures use different data format, so
only list some essential data meeting MDA’s demands are listed in this part. More detailed information is
available from IALA or VTS manufactures.
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